With his regime secure at home, Hussein next sought to
increase his power in the Arab world and on the international stage. His first
action in this new direction came in 1980, when Iraq attacked Iran. Although Iran and Iraq had a history of
rivalry, a serious dispute began in 1979, when the Islamic Revolution in Iran
stirred up anti-Baath sentiments among Iraq’s Shia Muslims, who had been long
excluded from political or economic power in Iraq despite their majority
status. As early as the mid- 1970s, Iraqi Shias, united by a Muslim group
called Al Daawa al Islamiya (meaning the Islamic Call), began to openly demonstrate
against the Baathist regime. Saddam Hussein, realizing the threat to his rule,
responded by banning the Daawa Party and executing Daawa leaders. In April 1980, “the people and army of Iraq must turn
their backs on the Ba’ath regime and overthrow it.” After numerous border
skirmishes between the two countries, Iraq attacked Iran on September 22, 1980,
leading to a protracted seven-year war. The Iraqi army, however, was unable to defeat
Iran, and by 1982 Iraq was on the defensive militarily. Eventually, fears about
the revolutionary, fundamentalist Islamic government in Iran caused many
countries to come to Iraq’s aid. Over the course of the war, the United
States provided billions of dollars of military support and surveillance
information to Iraq, including materials to help Iraq develop chemical and
biological weapons. The Iran-Iraq War ended through a United Nations–sponsored
ceasefire and resolution accepted in 1988. The war thus produced no victory for
either side but cost approximately 367,000 lives and resulted in massive
economic destruction for both countries. Iraq emerged from the war crippled economically
but with a strong military and chemical weapons, which Hussein used both
against Iran during the war and in Iraq against Kurdish civilians in 1987 and 1988.
The war, therefore, strengthened Saddam Hussein’s regime and turned Iraq into a
formidable military power. As Mideast expert Con Coughlin reports, “by 1988,
Iraq had developed the fourth largest army in the world.” After the war with
Iran, Saddam Hussein wanted to revive the Iraqi economy. At the same time, he
continued to build up the country’s military, including chemical, biological, and
nuclear weapons. He depended on profits from Iraqi oil to do both, even though
much of the oil income had to go first to repay war debts. As a result, Iraq’s economy
continued to struggle, and in 1990 Hussein began to pressure Kuwait and Saudi
Arabia to write off Iraqi debts incurred during the Iran-Iraq War. He accused
Kuwait of flooding the market in violation of OPEC (Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries) production quotas, causing a drop in Iraq’s oil revenues at
a time when Hussein could least afford it. Hussein also nursed long-held grievances
against Kuwait concerning two areas claimed historically by Iraq—oil fields in
Rumeila, an area on the border between the two countries, and two islands
overlooking one of Iraq’s two ports to the gulf. He demanded that Kuwait reduce
oil production, write off Iraqi debts, and help pay for Iraq’s reconstruction. Saddam
Hussein’s refusal to withdraw from Kuwait had profound consequences for Iraq. The
United States put together a coalition within the UN that included not only
traditional European allies but also Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and other Arab nations. The UN imposed
economic sanctions, which placed strict limits on the country’s exports and
imports and were aimed at forcing Hussein to withdraw and disarm. When Hussein
did not leave Kuwait, a massive military attack called Operation Desert Storm was
authorized by the United Nations and launched by the United States and its
allies on January 16, 1991. After the war the United Nations voted to keep
sanctions in place until all of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
programs were destroyed. A weapons inspection team, called the United Nations
Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM), was assembled to monitor the disarming,
and in the years that followed, UNSCOM uncovered and destroyed much of Iraq’s WMD
arsenal. Saddam Hussein, however, made the disarmament effort as difficult as possible
by blocking access, lying about the extent or existence of weapons programs, and
generally obstructing the UN team. Indeed, according to a background paper produced
by the administration of President George W. Bush, Hussein during this period “repeatedly
violated sixteen United Nations Security Council Resolutions designed to ensure
that Iraq [did] not pose a threat. The economic sanctions on Iraq, however, were
continued by the UN despite their heavy burden on the Iraqi economy and
population. The sanctions created in 1990 prohibited UN member states from importing
goods made in Iraq and from selling products to Iraq. UN members also were
disallowed from investing in any Iraqi economic activities. Exceptions were
made for humanitarian items such as certain food and medial supplies, but these
exceptions were very limited and did not include many items considered
necessary by Iraqis, such as clothes, shoes, blankets, spare parts for water
treatment and sewage disposal, educational materials, and similar items. No one
can deny that sanctions devastated the Iraqi economy, impoverished the middle
class, and created severe health and food crises. Also, as many as five hundred
thousand Iraqi children are estimated to have died as a result of sanctions.
The United Nations tried to respond to these humanitarian problems by
authorizing an oil-for-food program under which Iraq was allowed to sell oil to
purchase food, medicine, and other necessities. Most agree, however, that the
sanctions limited to some degree Hussein’s ability to import items that could
be used to produce conventional as well as nuclear and biological weapons. Hussein’s
tight security within his regime and the lack of substantial aid from the
United States made a coup against the Iraqi government very unlikely. In
addition, the United States failed to support the most promising uprising
against Hussein in decades. In 1991, at the end of Desert Storm, with
encouragement from U.S. president Bush, Iraqi Shias revolted in south southern Iraq;
the United States failed to intervene or provide aid, however, and Saddam Hussein
crushed the rebellion, killing thousands.
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, more
than ten years after Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, his country lay in ruins,
his people were starving, his economy was shattered, and his military was almost
destroyed. Yet he had managed to halt weapons inspections and weaken sanctions.
He had watched the broad coalition of nations that attacked him in 1991 fall apart.
No opposition groups had overthrown him .His regime had survived, and many
feared that he was once again developing weapons of mass destruction, including
nuclear weapons and the missiles.
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