#5. The Violence that Brings Silence: Iraq

America’s war in Iraq began on March 19, 2003, and was an exercise in overwhelming American firepower and force. Although troops faced unexpected resistance along the way and strikes appeared to have failed to kill Saddam Hussein, the bottom line was a quick U.S. victory signaled by the toppling of a huge statue of Saddam Hussein in the center of Baghdad on April 9, only weeks after the war began. The war demonstrated to the world that the United States had the ability to dominate Iraq militarily, sending a warning to other rogue nations that might be acting against U.S. interests. Months later, however, America had yet to convince the world of the rightness of its actions or win the peace in Iraq. Indeed, the United States led the military attack against Saddam Hussein’s regime after a long and fractious international debate, against the will of many of its traditional allies and amid a storm of demonstrations and protests around the world .U.S. president George W. Bush said war was necessary to rid Iraq of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, and to remove Hussein from power.

The criticism became lauder and stronger turning into rage as U.S. troops failed to provide security in the face of widespread looting and destruction and ethnic clashes between Iraq’s three ethnic groups (Sunnis, Shias, and Kurds).To make matters worse, American teams failed to find weapons of mass destruction, the main justification for going to war. Meanwhile, Iraqi demonstrators called the United States an “occupier” instead of a “liberator” and demanded that the U.S. forces leave Iraq immediately, even as Iraqi guerrilla fighters escalated attacks against U.S. troops trying to stabilize the country.

Iraq’s tattered economy and infrastructure were predictable, given more than a decade of restrictive UN economic sanctions, the destruction of three wars, and the fallout from almost three decades of terror and thievery by Saddam Hussein and his followers. Postwar Iraq, therefore, is a mammoth project and one that will likely require many U.S. taxpayer dollars and a long-term commitment of U.S. troops. The challenges for America are daunting.

The United States must overcome the deep distrust of American motives in Iraq. Only by first successfully stabilizing and reconstructing and then by handing over full democratic control to Iraqis will the United States be seen as Iraq’s “liberator.” The true measure of the success or failure of the U.S.-led war will be determined by what kind of government and society emerges in Iraq.

Bibliography:

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